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SENIORITY RIGHTS IN LABOR RELATIONS
SECURITY of tenure assumes prime importance as an objective of employed
workers under economic conditions that severely restrict chances for ad-
vancement Labor's attempts to attain this end have often led to the incor-
poration in collective trade agreements of the principle of seniority'-a
1. See generally REPORT OF THE EGHT-HoTm Co .missio: (Wash., Govt. Print-
ing Office, 1918) 305-316, 387-396; THE SENionnTY RuLxs OF THE NATIONAL AaT-
mENT (Brief before U. S. Railroad Labor Board, prepared by V. 3. Lauclr of the
BUREAU OF RESEARCH, RAILWAY EmTLOYEEs' DEPARTMENT, A-EcAN FEDEATrION OF
LABOR, 1921); E. C. BRowx, Jorxr INDUSTRIAL CONTROL iN THE BoOK AND JoB
PRINTING INDUSTRY (U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin No. 481, 1928);
J. D. BRowx, RAILWAY LABoR SURvEY (Social Science Research Council, Division of
Industry and Trade, 1933, mimeogr.) 104-106; CArTN, THE LArOR Pnoim. (2d.
ed. 1935) 327, 478, 492; McIsAAc, THE ORDER OF RAnoAD TELEGnr ERns (1933)
254; RALROAD WAGES AND VoRING RULEs (National Industrial Conference Board,
Research Report No. 46, 1922) 40; ROUNTREE, THE RAILWAY WVoans, (1936) 29,
216-228, 273; SMELSER, UNEMPLOYMENT AND AEmRICAN TRADE: Uxaoms. (1919) 44,
107; STEVNs, NEW YoRx TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION No. 6 (Annual Report of the
Bureau of Labor Statistics of New York, 1911, part I) 529; WooD, Union-MA ACMEM;?
CooPERATION ON THE RAR oADS (1931) 58; Barnett, The Printers (1909) 10 A2r.
EcoN. Ass'N Q., Third Ser. 3, p. 230; Christenson, Seniority Rights under Labor Union
Working Agreements (1937) 11 TmE,. L. Q. 355.
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principle under which length of employment determines the order of lay-offs,
rehirings, and advancements.
2
Seniority first emerged in the railroad industry of the '80's, in an at-
mosphere of stratified opportunity and precarious tenure.8 The growth of
vast and complex railroad organizations and of absentee ownership militated
against recognition of merit. And several factors combined to make employ-
ment insecure. Not only were nepotism and job-selling rife, but it was the
customary practice for superintendents, in their frequent shifts from road
to road, to transplant employees who ousted the incumbents of the lower
positions. The seniority movement in the railroad industry grew slowly,
spreading from west to east and from craft to craft 4 until it became definitively
established under governmental wartime administration., Today, the sen-
iority principle has reached its fullest development in the railroad industry,
but it has also gained a strong foothold in numerous other industries,G
especially the printing trades,7 and even now is making its appearance in
the automobile8 and steel industries.9
Seniority rights stem almost exclusively from collective trade agreements
between labor unions and employers. The provisions range from a short
sentence recognizing the rule of seniority, to an elaborate code of detailed
regulations, covering many printed pages. The administration of seniority
is ordinarily entrusted to the employer. Unjustified departures on his part
from the principles laid down in the trade agreements are considered as
grievances. Various procedures have been provided for their redress. 10 The
2. These three features of the seniority rule are ordinarily but not necessarily
combined. Preferential rights of minor importance may be added, such as the privilege
of choosing the time for vacations. Agreement between Sinclair Refining Co. and
International Association of Oil Field, Gas Well and Refinery Workers of America
(1936).
3. REPORT OF THE EIGHT-HoUR CoMMIssIoN, mspro note 1, at 307.
4. Id. at 305 et seq.; McIsAAc, op. cit. mupra note 1, at 256. The clerks on the
N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. operated under the seniority rule as early as 1909. Materials
on the early developments of railroad seniority are extremely scarce.
5. See SENIORITY RULES OF THE NATIONAL AGREEMENT, Mspra note 1; Wou', THE
RAILROAD LABOR BOARD (1927) 38 et seq.
6. Seniority rules of some kind are found in the following industries: aluminum,
bakeries, barbers, blacksmiths, borax, breweries, brick and clay, cigarettes and tobacco,
coal, dyeing and finishing, gas stations, glass, hosiery, machinists, mine, mill and smelter
workers, paper, petroleum, powder, street railways, telegraphers, telephone operators,
textiles, window washers. Abstracts or summaries of trade agreements will be found in
the Monthly Labor Review; in Bulletins 393 (1923-24), 419 (1925), 448 (1926), 468
(1927) of the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics; and in the Report of the Federal
Co-ordinator of Transportation on Hours, Wages and Working Conditions in the Inter-
city Motor Transport Industries, Part III (1936, mimeogr.) 169-209.
7. E. C. BROWN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 92, 102, 107.
8. See N. Y. Times, March 13, 1937, p. 6; (1937) 44 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 667.
9. See N. Y. Times, March 18, 1937, p. 6; (1937) 44 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 1238.
10. See e.g., BLOCH, LABOR AGREEMENTS IN COAL MINES (1931) 101.
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aggrieved employee must usually submit his case to officers of the union
or to a union committee. If the case is found meritorious, the union will
enter into negotiations with the representatives of the employer. If no
agreement can be reached, provision is frequently made for resort to arbi-
tration. Special tribunals, set up by the federal government, act as arbiters
in the railroad industry. Section 304 of the Transportation Act of 1920"1
vested the Railroad Labor Board12 with a quasi-judicial power to determine
seniority disputes. After the Board was abolished in 1926,13 regional ad-
justment boards undertook the adjudication of grievance cases,1 4 until the
Railway Labor Act of 19341s centralized their task in the National Railroad
Adjustment Board in Chicago.' 6 During the N. R.A. similar boards were
established in other industries,' 7 the most important of these being the
Automobile Labor Board' 8 and the Petroleum Labor Policy Board.10 In
the printing and related trades "priority" is administered by the foremen
rather than by the employers.2 0 Since the closed shop ordinarily prevails
in the industry, the foremen, as union members, are obliged to obey the
priority rules of their organizations. Grievances are settled within the unions
by means of the remedies provided in the by-laws, or by arbitration between
the union and the employer.
Employees, dissatisfied with the decisions of the internal tribunals or
the mixed railroad boards, have occasionally sought redress in the courts.
11. 41 STAT. 456, 470 (1920).
12. See Wor', TEE RA.oAD LAmOR BoAm (1927); W,,p, Tun U. S. RAeoAD
LABoR BoARD Awn RAILwAY LA R DxseuTrs (1929). Seniority disputes constituted of
course only a minor, though substantial fraction of the Board's business. For the method
of adjusting labor disputes during the governmental administration of railroads, see
Von', supra, at 47 et seq.
13. Railway Labor Act, 44 STAT. 577, 587 (1926) § 14.
14. Railway Labor Act, 44 STAT. 577, 578 (1926) § 3; cf. Bell v. Western Ry. of
Alabama, 228 Ala. 328, 153 So. 434 (1934) (railroad employee held bound to talze his
seniority grievance before the adjustment board instead of resorting to the courts).
For a brief account see First Annual Report of the National Mediation Board (1935)
37, 38.
15. 48 STAT. 1185, 1189, 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1934).
16. See Garrison, The National Railroad Adjustinent Board (1937) 46 YAE
L. J. 567.
17. See BERNHEIM am VAN DoaRN, LABoR AND THE GovEN .sm.-r (1935) ; Loaw;
AND WUBMIG, LAOR RELATioNs BoARDs (1935).
1& See Statement of the Automobile Labor Board, May 18, 1934; Lovr AND
WtBmN, op. cit. supra note 17, at 361. For criticisms directed against the seniority
practice of the Board, see notes 56, 72, infra.
19. The award of the Arbitration Board in the controversy between the Gasoline
Station Operators Union No. 18378 and the major oil companies of Cleveland and
Cuyahoga County [Decisions of Petroleum Labor Policy Board 78, 83 (1934)] estab-
lished seniority as one of the governing principles.
20. Under a union rule in existence since 1858 the union members may secure
their jobs only through application to the foreman. See STvENs, op. cit. stipra note 1,
at 529.
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However, severdl difficulties stand in the way of the complaining employee
who seeks judicial protection.21 He must first exhaust the remedies provided
either in the trade agreements or in the union by-laws unless these remedies
can be characterized as obviously futile. 2 And if he has submitted his case
to an internal tribunal, the decision will be set aside only if it is termed
arbitrary or obviously unreasonable.? Since the right to be heard in a
seniority dispute is protected by the due process clauses, seniority being con-
sidered "property" for that purpose,24 the complainant may further be in-
convenienced by the necessity of joining other claimants for the job or
others affected by the dispute.25 This doctrine may impose onerous pro-
cedural obstacles, for if the displacement of a senior employee occasions
similar displacements down the entire seniority list, it is necessary to join
a large number of employees as defendants.28 This inconvenience may per-
haps be avoided by the institution of a representative class suit.21
Even if these hurdles are surmounted, 28 an employee who seeks to assert
seniority rights in a suit against his employer may be confronted with
serious difficulties. For while courts have frequently recognized the enforce-
21. See Christenson, supra note 1, at 377 et seq.
22. Shaup v. Grand Int. Brotherhood, 223 Ala. 202, 135 So. 327 (1931); Bell v.
Western Ry. of Alabama, 228 Ala. 328, 153 So. 434 (1934); Norfolk & W. Ry. v.
Harris, 260 Ky. 132, 84 S. W. (2d) 69 (1935); Henry v. Twichell, 286 Mass. 106,
189 N. E. 593 (1934); Yazoo & M. V. R. R. v. Mitchell, 173 Miss. 594, 161 So. 86D
(1935) ; Crisler v. Crum, 115 Neb. 375, 213 N. W. 366 (1927) ; Burger v. McCarthy,
84 W. Va. 697, 100 S. E. 492 (1919); West v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 103 W. Va. 417,
137 S. E. 654 (1927); Comments (1936) 45 YAix L. J. 1248, 1259; (1936) 20 Mxn.
L. REv. 657, 664.
23. See notes 105, 117-119, 139, infra.
24. Nord v. Griffin, 86 F. (2d) 481 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936), cert. denied, 57 Sup.
Ct. 612; Estes v. Union Terminal Co., 89 F. (2d) 768 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937); Griffin
v. Chicago Union Station, 13 F. Supp. 722 (N. D. Ill. 1936); Gregg v. Starks, 189
Ky. 834, 224 S. W. 459 (1920).
25. McMurray v. Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen, 50 F. (2d) 968 (W. D. Pa.
1931); Cannon v. Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen, 262 Ky. 113, 89 S. W. (2d) 620
(1935); Gordon v. Hawkins, 66 S. W. (2d) 432 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933); cf. McGregor
v. Louisville & N. R. R., 244 Ky. 696, 51 S. W. (2d) 953 (the union and the employees
who might be displaced by the plaintiff have a right to intervene).
26. In Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v. Price, 108 S. W. (2d) 239 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1937), more than 150 employees were affected by the asserted seniority rights.
27. Grand Int. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Mills, 43 Ariz. 379, 31
P. (2d) 971 (1934). But the union has been held not to be a proper class representative
in seniority suits. Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v. Price, 108 S. W. (2d) 239"
(Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
28. Jurisdictional mistakes are another .hazard encountered. The duties imposed
with respect to collective bargaining by § 2 of the Railway Labor Act [44 STAT. 577'
(1926)] do not render a seniority controversy a suit arising under the laws of thc-
United States and federal courts have therefore no jurisdiction over such controversies.
Malone v. Gardner, 62 F. (2d) 15 (C. C. A. 4th, 1932); cf. Lane v. Union Terminat
Co., 12 F. Supp. 204 (N. D. Texas 1935).
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ability of seniority rights in suits against unions9 or their officers, or against
competing employees,30 they have generally not enforced them in suits against
employers. Some courts deny the existence of a right, others ackmowledge
the right but deny a remedy. Those courts which employ the former rationale
state that the seniority clause is wanting in mutuality since the employee is
privileged to quit the service at any time.3 ' But under conventional contract
doctrines, the subsequent labor of the employee is sufficient to support the
employer's promise.32 Nor do the objections of those courts which adopt
the latter ground seem persuasive. Specific performance has been denied
on the grounds that seniority is not a property right which will be
protected by equity,-" that the relations between master and servant are
highly personal 34 and that courts should not charge themselves with the
conduct of an employer's business.35 But these are statements of result rather
than reasons. Seniority has been labelled a property right for other pur-
poses;36 and the rule against specific performance of service contracts has
little justification under conditions of modem mass production, at least so
far as the employer is concerned. Equally unconvincing are the reasons
advanced by the courts to support a denial of damages for the loss of security
of employment. Such damages are thought to be too remote and too specu-
lative because the value of seniority rights depends on the general trend
of employment, the condition of the employer's business and the place of
the employee on the seniority list.37 But juries have often been allowed to
29. But the union itself was not considered as a suable entity in Graham v. Grand
Division Order of Railway Conductors, 107 S. IV. (2d) 121 (Mo. App. 1937).
30. Grand Int Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Mills, 43 Ariz. 379, 31
P. (2d) 971 (1934); Gleason v. Thomas, 186 S. E. 304 (V.Va. 1936). Accord: Gregg
v. Starks, 188 Ky. 834, 224 S. W. 459 (1920); Piercy v. Louisville & N. Ry., 193 Ky.
477, 248 S. W. 1042 (1923).
31. Louisville & N. R. R. v. Bryant, 263 Ky. 578, 92 S. NV. (2d) 749 (1936);
Beatty v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. K, 49 Wyo. 22, 52 P. (2d) 404 (1935). Contra:
Rentschler v. Missouri Pac. R. R., 126 Neb. 493, 253 N. V. 694 (1934).
32. 1 WLiLSTON, CoNtAcTs (2d ed. 1936) §§ 102, 139 et seq.
33. Shaup v. Grand Int. Brotherhood, 223 Ala. 202, 135 So. 327 (1931); Burger
v. McCarthy, 84 V. Va. 697, 100 S. E. 492 (1919). Seniority has been held not to
be "property within the state!' for the purpose of obtaining in rem jurisdiction. Gore
v. Pennsylvania R. R., 144 Misc. 639, 259 N. Y. Supp. 410 (Sup. Ct. 1932), aff'd, 236
App. Div. 881, 260 N. Y. Supp. 941 (4th Dep't 1932).
34. Louisville & N. R. R. v. Bryant, 263 Ky. 578, 92 S. NV. (2d) 749 (1936);
Mosshamer v. Wabash Ry., 221 Mich. 407, 191 N. NV. 210 (1922) ; Ryan v. New York
Central K. K, 267 Mich. 202, 255 N. V. 365 (1934); Chambers v. Davis, 128 Miss.
613, 91 So. 346 (1922); Beatty v. Chicago, B. & Q. K. K, 49 Vyo. 22, 52 P. (2d)
404 (1935). But cp Gregg v. Starks, 188 Ky. 834, 224 S. NV. 459 (1920) ; Piercy v.
Louisville & N. Ry., 198 Ky. 477, 248 S. NV. 1042 (1923).
35. Mosshamer v. Wabash Ry., 221 Mich. 407, 191 N. NV. 210 (1922).
36. See note 24, supra.
37. Gary v. Central of Georgia Ry., 37 Ga. App. 744, 141 S. E. 819 (1928),
44 Ga. App. 120, 160 S. E. 716 (1931); Louisville & N. K. K. v. Br*ant, 263 Ky. 578,
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assess damages of equally uncertain nature. And in any event this problem
would not be encountered if specific performance were decreed, since the
wages lost up to the date of trial are definitely ascertainable.38
The unfavorable attitude of the judiciary has, however, a lesser impact on
seniority rights than might be expected, since those seniority disputes which
eventually reach the courts form a small fraction of those heard by the internal
and mixed tribunals. And these latter agencies enforce seniority rights with-
out hesitancy. Specific performance and recovery of back pay are granted
in proper cases,39 although the latter remedy is sometimes denied if the
employer has acted in good faith.40 The various railroad boards have insisted
that every reasonable interpretation in favor of seniority should be adopted,
since seniority is considered as one of the foundations of the railroad trade
agreements. 41 Thus the scope of the seniority right today can best be de-
termined by a consideration of the provisions of the trade agreements and of
the work of the railroad boards in expounding and amplifying those agree-
ments.
LAY-OFFs, REINSTATEMENTS AND ADVANCEMENTS
While the trade agreements generally make the seniority rule applicable
to lay-offs, reinstatements, and advancements, the scope of these three aspects
of seniority is not always defined with precision. Serious controversy has
arisen, in particular, over the breadth of the lay-off preference. During the
recent depression junior employees insisted that lay-offs be curtailed and the
92 S. W. (2d) 749 (1936); Rentschler v. Missouri Pac. R. R., 126 Neb. 493, 253 N. W.
694 (1934). The more liberal attitude of federal courts is evidenced by their willing-
ness to appraise the value of seniority above $3,000 for the purpose of assuming
jurisdiction; to attain this end the value of the future right to a job is taken into
account. Nord v. Griffin, 86 F. (2d) 481 (C.C.A. 7th, 1936), cert. denied, 57 Sup.
Ct. 612.
38. Compensation for wages lost up to the date of trial has been granted. Cook
v. Des Moines Union Ry., 16 F. Supp. 810 (S. D. Iowa 1936); McGee v. St. Joseph
Belt Ry., 93 S. W. (2d) 1111 (Mo. App. 1936); McCrory v. Kurn, 101 S. W. (2d)
114 (Mo. App. 1936); San Antonio & A. P. Ry. v. Collins, 61 S. W. (2d) 84 (Tex.
Comm. App. 1933); see Beatty v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 49 Wyo. 22, 52 P. (2d)
404 (1935). An employee discharged despite his seniority is not bound to seek other
employment to mitigate his damages, if he would thereby lose his seniority standing.
San Antonio & A. P. Ry. v. Collins, supra.
39. As a rule the orders of the National Railroad Adjustment Board are obeyed,
Annual Reports of the National Mediation Board (1935) 29, (1936) 34; Garrison,
supra note 16, at 591. If necessary they may be enforced under the provisions of the
Railway Labor Act, 48 STAT. 1192, First (p), 45 U.S.C. § 153, First (p) (1934);
ef. Cook v. Des Moines Union Ry., 16 F. Supp. 810 (S. D. Iowa 1936).
40. See, e.g., Nat. R. R. Adj. Board, Third Div. I No. 35, 44, 61, 67 (1935),
II No. 108, 128 (1935), 136, 256 (1936).
41. Nat. R. R. Adj. Board, Third Div. II No. 105-107, 132 (1935), 188 (1936);
cf. R. R. Lab. Board II No. 119 (1921).
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available work be distributed equally among all employees.42 In this they
were supported by the unions who favored distribution because it increased
their dues. When several carriers agreed to spread the work, however, their
power to do so was challenged by the senior employees.43 But there was
little basis for their attack. While the promise of preferential employment
determines the order of lay-offs in the case of force reductions, it does not
bind the employer to effect a force reduction in order to secure more work
for his remaining employees. And since in times of great unemployment the
policy of spreading work is desirable,4 the seniority clauses in the trade agree-
ments should be confined to their necessary implications and the employer
should be allowed to distribute his work. The Railroad Labor Board and
the National Railroad Adjustment Board have repeatedly refused to inter-
pret trade agreements so as to deny the carrier that power.45 These decisions,
of course, will not foreclose a contrary ruling when differently-worded trade
agreements are involved.40 Various trade agreements now incorporate the
-rule of distribution, sometimes alone, and sometimes as a supplement to the
seniority rules.
47
42. See J. D. BROWN, op. cit. mipra note 1, at 104, ci seq. There were entire
divisions on certain roads where hardly a single fireman or trainman had been em-
ployed for long periods because they had been suliplanted by engineers and conductors.
(1932) 93 RAILWAY AGE 779. Furloughed railroad men find it hard to secure other
jobs, since employers know that these men will return to the railroad service, if called
for, in order not to lose their seniority rights.
43. It is clear that the value of the preferential rights of the older men is greatly
reduced by the rule of distribution. Not only their current wages, but also their
pension rights are affected, since pensions are determined both by years of service
and by -average earnings. See J. D. BRowN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 105; SraxnmAN,
LAwv AND LABOR RELATIONS (1936) 30; (1933) 94 RAILwAY AmE 704.
44. See REPORT OF THE FEDERAL Co-ORDINATOR OF TRANsPORTATIOn (1934). H. R.
Doc. No. 89, 74th CONG., 1st SESS., pp. 99, 131. The federal labor boards, when
assuming arbitral functions, likewise indicated the desirability of spreading work,
though not to the extent of reducing wages below a minimum standard of subsistence.
See, e.g., The Rosedale Knitting Co., Inc., and the American Federation of Hosiery
Workers, 1 N LB 52 (1934); Consolidated Film Industries and New York Printing
Pressme's Union No. 51, 2 N L B 82 (1934).
45. R. R. Lab. Board II No. 334, 519 (1921), III No. 771, 1040 (1922); IV No.
1667 (1923); Nat. R. R. Adj. Board, Third Div., I No. 31, 32 (1935), II No. 189,
219, 290 (1936).
46. In Nat. R. R. Adj. Board, Third Div., II No. 189 (1936) it was indicated that
a clear rule guaranteeing six days' work each week would preclude the employer from
spreading work; but the language of the agreement that "six consecutive days shall
constitute a week's work" was held not to establish such a guaranty.
47. The agreement of the Locomotive Engineers with the N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R.
(February 19, 1931), art. 25(B), provides that no reductions in force will be made so
long as those in passenger service are earning the equivalent of 4,000 miles per month
-those in service paying freight rates are earning the equivalent of 3,200 miles per
month-those on the extra list are averaging the equivalent of 2,600 miles per month.
This "rule of mileage" has gained considerable importance in railroad labor agreements;
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A principle, akin to distribution is laid down in the trade agreements to
make adjustments for irregular traffic. 48 Since more than half of the rail-
road traffic depends on the amount of freight to be handled from time to
time, the number of regular runs available for engineers, firemen, conductors,
and trainmen is limited. Only the oldest men in the service can hope to
obtain a regular assigned run with a definite time to start and to end work
each day. To take care of the irregular traffic, employees whose service age
does not entitle them to regular work are placed on the so-called extra board
or revolving board, which operates under a system called "first in, first
out."' 49 The man on the top of the list is the first to be called to work; he
"stands first out." His work done he returns to the bottom of the list; he
"stands last out." In the operation of the revolving board seniority does
not play a part, all men on the board having equal rights to be called in
their turn. When work dwindles below a certain minimum, however, the
younger men are the first to be laid off, and the seniors are the first in line
to be assigned to regular jobs as they become vacant. Sometimes there will
be two extra boards in one district, one for senior men occupying the more
desirable jobs, the other one for the juniors. For emergency cases there
may be an extra list of men, who cannot expect continuous employment,
but are called in only as the need arises. The new employees and men
dropped from the extra board are listed on emergency boards of this kind.
Under the trade agreements an employee whose job has been abolished50
is ordinarily allowed to exercise "bumping" privileges against a junior man.
The latter in turn supplants his junior and this process is continued
until the youngest man is removed from the service. Obviously this system
entails a considerable amount of inconvenience and hardship for the employees
affected and for the employer. In order to minimize these disadvantages, trade
agreements frequently seek to avoid disturbing the tenure of the holders of
intermediate positions by providing that displacement privileges may be
asserted only against the youngest man51 or a group of the youngest em-
ployees. 52 Not until a new vacancy arises may the senior man, whose former
it constitutes a compulsory, though limited, systerfi of sharing the available work. In
other cases the basis for distribution is a minimum number of hours per week. See,
e.g., the agreement of the United Electrical and Radio Workers of America, Local
106, with the Wirt Co.
48, For a detailed discussion of the procedure described in the text see the RsroaR
OF THE EIGHT-HouR CoMmissioN, supra note 1, at 312 et seq.
49. The operation of the revolving board is well illustrated by Nat. R. R. Adj.
Board, First Div., VIII No. 1410 (1936).
50. The question of what amounts to the "abolition" of a job is often a close
one. See Nat R. R. Adj. Board, Third Div., II No. 188 (1936); R. R. Lab. Board
VI No. 3461, 3487 (1925). And see San Antonio & R. P. Ry. v. Collins, 61 S. W.
(2d) 84 (Tex. Comm. App. 1933).
51. See Nat. R. R. Adj. Board, Third Div., I No. 50 (1935).
52. See Nat R. R. Adj. Board, Third Div., II No. 129 (1935).
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position has been abolished, be promoted to a more desirable job. During
economic depressions this rule has met with some opposition on the part of
the senior employees because the scarcity of vacancies offers them only a
xemote chance of promotion to a preferred position.53  While difficulties
similar to those of the displacement process are encountered when an em-
ployee is advanced from one position to another, no provision apparently
is made in the trade agreements to care for this situation. The problem is
perhaps slightly less acute, since the employee may, under most agreements,
refuse to assert his advancement privilege without forsaking his priority
rights to other vacancies.54 But this option would have a material effect
only if it were availed of by a sizeable number of employees.
The trade agreements also delimit to some extent the right to preferential
reinstatement of employees who are laid off but not discharged.5 Provisions
of this kind are designed particularly for industries suffering from seasonal
unemployment. If reinstatement does not occur within a specified time,
usually from three months to a year,50 the unemployment is taken to be
permanent rather than seasonal and the reinstatement privilege expires.,"
An awareness of the limited span of the reinstatement privilege has induced
the railroad boards to stretch the provisions of the trade agreement relating
to temporary vacancies so as to include those positions within the seniority
rule.58 Senior laid-off men are thereby allowed to protect their seniority.
During the lay-off the men may seek employment elsewhere, provided that
they keep ready -and willing to re-enter the service of their former employer
after reasonable notice.r9
53. For a detailed discussion see McIsAAc, op. cit. stpra note 1, at 257 ct seq.
54. R. R. Lab. Board III No. 1343 (1922).
55. The furloughed men retain their seniority rights and are entitled to cast their
votes in the election of employees' representatives. City-Auto Stamping Co. and Int.
Union, United Automobile Workers of Am, Local No. 12, 3 N LRB No. 24 (1937).
Cf. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen v. Kenan, 87 F. (2d) 651
(C. CA. 5th, 1937); Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v. National Mediation Board,
88 F. (2d) 757 (App. D. C., 1936).
56. The six months limit for reinstatements established by the Automobile Labor
Board has been considered as insufficient, since during the depression even efficient
workers were frequently laid off for longer periods. See National Recovery Adminis-
tration, Research and Planning Division, Preliminary Report on Study of Regular-
ization of Employment and Improvement of Labor Conditions in the Automobile
Industry (1935, typewritten) Appendix B, Exhibit 19, p. 19.
57. But see Nat. R. R. Adj. Board, Third Div., I No. 91 (1935) (in absence of
pertinent provision in trade agreement employer may not establish retroactive time
limit.)
58. Nat. R. R. Adj. Board, Third Div., II No. 105-107, 132 (1935).
59. See George v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 183 Minn. 610, 235 N. NV. 673, 237
N. W. 876 (1931).
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RECOGNITION OF MERIT
The seniority rule ordinarily does not completely divest the employer of
the power to recognize merit,60 for the heavy responsibilities of railroad
operation forbid forcing on the carrier an employee of doubtful qualifica-
tions.61 The employer may therefore always discharge an employee who is
proved to be incompetent. But the employer's power to prefer better-quali-
fied employees in disregard of the rule of seniority is somewhat limited.
Trade agreements usually confine seniority to cases where the ability 2 and
efficiency of the applicants for a job are equal;6 but since absolute equality
will never be found, the rule is construed to mean that only striking differ-
ences in competence warrant a departure from seniority. 4 In other agree-
ments the test of fitness is sufficiency of ability rather than equality of com-
petence.6 5 Either provision gives the employer a wide latitude, since his
judgment is not subject to judicial review unless arbitrariness or bad faith
are shown.60 But he must state specific facts to justify his departure from
the order of seniority; he can not merely assert that the employee lacks
60. The claim that seniority prevents giving preference to the better man has been
one of the main objections advanced by employers against the seniority rule. See
CATLiN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 327, 479, 480.
61. Nat. R. R. Adj. Board, Third Div. II No. 235 (1936).
62. Ability is ordinarily understood in terms of training and competency. Legal
disabilities, however, have also been held to break seniority privileges. Thus a job
may require overtime work; if the state laws forbid overtime for women, the senior
female applicant may be disqualified. See R. R. Lab. Board II No. 269, 345 (1921),
III No. 1038 (1922); cf. III No. 661, 727 (1922).
63. See, e.g., the trade agreements of the N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. with the
Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees (November 6, 1936), Rule 10(B)
(" . . . promotion shall . . . be based on ability, merit and seniority. Ability and
merit being equal, seniority shall prevail.").
64. See Nat. R. R. Adj. Board, Third Div., I No. 44 (1935). The agreement in
that case provided that where qualifications are equal, seniority will prevail. Although
the junior man had more experience, the senior man was held entitled to the job,
unless definite reasons were shown why he was not qualified.
65. See, e.g., agreements of the N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. with System Federation
No. 17, Railway Employees' Department Mechanical Section thereof (April 9, 1937)
Rule 16: "When new jobs are created or vacancies occur in the respective crafts, the
oldest employees in point of service shall, if sufficient ability is shown by trial, be given
preference in filling such new jobs or any vacancies that may be desirable to them."
Under the "sufficient ability" clause a junior man's superior experience was held not
to justify a departure from the order of seniority, where the senior man possessed
adequate competence. R. R. Lab. Board V No. 2639 (1924).
66. Nat. R. R. Adj. Board, Third Div. I No. 96, 98 (1935), II No. 106, 110
(1935), 275 (1936). The R. R. Lab. Board seems to have assumed the unrestricted
review of questions of ability. See II No. 124, 141, 213, 458, 475, 538, 558 (1921);
III No. 705, 735, 836 (1922); IV No. 1630 (1923); V 2202 (1924); VI No. 3188,
3368. See Garrison, supra note 16 at 586. Cf. Rentschler v. Missouri Pac. R. R.,
126 Neb. 493, 253 N. W. 694 (1934).
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experience and ability. 7 A suspicion of bad faith arises if the carrier fails
to assert the inefficiency of the senior man in due time.c0 Full familiarity
of an applicant with the duties of the new position cannot be demanded, for
the employee must be given an opportunity to acquaint himself with his
new task.0 9 The carrier may discriminate between employees on the ground
of merit in cases of promotion, displacement, lay-off and reinstatement.1 0
In no case, however, will the Railroad Adjustment Board overrule the
carrier's decision without further investigation. Sometimes an examination
or a probationary period is ordered, the results to be submitted to the
Board as final arbiter.
7 '
The fact that there is so much discretion in the hands of the employer
with so little control over its exercise is felt by the unions to invite evasions
of the seniority rule.72 Those trade agreements which are drawn with greater
technical refinement seek to cope with the problem in various ways. One
method is to limit the number of departures from the seniority rule permitted
the employer, to a definite percentage of all the promotions, demotions,
and reinstatements within a given period.73 A more satisfactory system
allows preferments outside the regular order only with the assent of the
union or a union-elected shop committee; arbitration is sometimes provided
for cases where differences of opinion as to a man's ability cannot be amicably
settled.74 Another device provides for a trial period before a new job is
definitely assigned to an employee. During that period the employee keeps
his seniority on his old job, to which he may be sent back at the employer's
discretion. If, however, he is retained at the new job beyond the trial period,
67. Nat. R. R. Adj. Board, Third Div. I No. 44 (1935), II No. 103 (1935), 275
(1936). An employee's right to promotion is not defeated by his lack of fitness for
still further advancement. Nat. R. R. Adj. Board, Third Div., I No. 62 (1935).
A man who was repeatedly and successfully used as assistant foreman cannot be denied
sufficient ability for promotion to regular foreman. Nat. R. R. Adj. Board, Third
Div., II 214 (1936).
68. R. R. Lab. Board III No. 1247 (1922); Nat. R. R. Adj. Board, Third Div.
I No. 65 (1935), II No. 256 (1936).
69. Nat. R. R. Adj. Board, Third Div. II No. 108 (1935); see R. R. Lab. Board
II No. 124 (1921).
70. Nat. R. R. Adj. Board, Third Div. II No. 275 (1936).
71. See the decisions of the Board's Third Div. I No. 44, 65 (1935), II No. 108
(1935), 214, 275 (1936).
72. The struggle over the "individual merit clause' in the N. I. R. A. codes of
fair competition is significant. See LoRwaIN AND WtmiG, op. cit. supra note 17, at
65-68, 363. The Automobile Labor Board's susceptibility to the clause was one of the
main factors in discrediting it in the eyes of labor. See Auroonu IArto RPmoenT,
supra note 56, Conditions of the Industry 50, Appendix B, Exhibit 19, p. 19.
73. See, e.g., agreement between Sinclair Refining Co. and Int. Ass'n of Oil Field,
Gas Well and Refinery Workers of America (October 1, 1936) art. VI 3.
74. See, e.g., agreement between Empire Oil and Refining Co. and Local Union
No. 210 of Int. Ass'n of Oil Field, Gas Well and Refinery Workers of America
(October 1, 1936) art. 3, sec. 1(j).
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his ability is conclusively presumed to be adequate and a removal cannot
ordinarily be based on lack of efficiency. 5 A final plan calls for examina-
tions to test fitness for promotion."
The power of the employer to discriminate on grounds of merit is further
recognized by the exemption from the seniority rule of certain positions of
higher responsibility. 7 While such jobs are ordinarily designated in the
trade agreement with much detail, the question of the classification of a
particular job as an exempt or "official" position may cause some doubt. 78
Recourse will frequently be taken in such cases to the former dealings of
the parties. Where the brotherhood and the incumbent for several years
treated the job as an official one, they can no longer insist that it should
be subject to the seniority rule.7 9 If the carrier fails to offer a newly created
position to the senior applicant because he considers it as an official one,
his action must promptly be protested by any interested party; an employee
who has slept on his rights cannot at a later date deny the exempt character
of the job.80 If, on the other hand, the carrier does bulletin a position, he
must give it to the senior applicant; and he will not be heard asserting that
the job actually was an exempt one.8 ' The holders of exempt positions, who
have been promoted from the rank and file, ordinarily retain their priority
rights in the service,82 but if dismissed from the exempt position, 'they are
not always allowed to displace their juniors from regular jobs. They may be
placed on the extra board, where they must wait for a vacancy on which to
exercise their seniority rights.
75. See, e.g., the agreements of the N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. with the Brotherhood
of Railway and Steamship Clerks (July 1, 1921), Rule 9, and with the Brotherhood
of Maintenance of Way Employees (November 6, 1936), Rule 13(A).
76. See, e.g., agreement of the N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. with the Brotherhood
of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen (February 1, 1927), art. 42(B). It has been
held to be proper for a brotherhood to contract with a railroad company that failure
in an examination shall entail a certain loss of seniority. Casey v. Brotherhood, 197
Minn. 189, 266 N. W. 737 (1936).
77. As a rule the employer's discretion in filling exempt positions is unrestricted.
R. R. Lab. Board V No. 2572 (1924). For a limitation see Nat. R. R. Adj. Board
Third Div., II No. 187 (1936) (the holder of an exempt position, when displaced by
a junior employee, was held not to have those displacement rights in the ordinary service
he would have had if displaced by a senior officer).
78. Where under the terms of the agreement the excepted character of a position
is doubtful its more or less confidential nature may determine the classification. Nat.
R. R. Adj. Board, Third Div., II No. 199 (1936). See R. R. Lab. Board III No.
986 (1922).
79. Nat. R. R. Adj. Board, Third Div., I No. 72 (1935).
80. Nat. R. R. Adj. Board, Third Div., II No. 116 (1935).
81. Nat. R. R. Adj. Board, Third Div., II No. 104 (1935).
82. R. R. Labor Board III No. 1370 (1922). But in the absence of a rule in the
trade agreement preserving accumulated seniority rights, an employee holding an exempt
position has been held to have lost his seniority standing. Nat. R. R. Adj. Board,
Third Div., I No. 6 (1935). Cf. Boucher v. Godfrey, 119 Conn. 622, 178 Atl. 655
(1935).
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DEPARTMENTALIZATION
Seniority rights would seem to be of most value to the employee if they
could be exercised with respect to jobs in the entire business unit. Practical
difficulties, however, militate against such a widespread application, for the
shifting of skilled laborers from one trade to another meets the opposition
of both employer and employees. The employer, in order to minimize the
cost of training and the waste of material incident to the breaking in of
the senior man to his new job, is anxious to restrict seniority rights to
jobs closely related to those previously held.83 The employees, too, are often
reluctant to assume strange duties, since incompetence in the new position
may result in discharge and a complete loss of all seniority rights.8 4 Fur-
thermore, where the employer's operations extend over distant localities,
as in the case of the railroads, the unlimited exercise of seniority is also
restricted by the costs and social inconvenience of a change of residence.Y
Some sort of departmentalization along occupational and geographical lines
is therefore necessary if seniority is to operate efficiently. In actual practice
the extent of this subdivision has been limited by the desire to preserve an
adequate reservoir of jobs wiihin which seniority rights may be exercised.
Since railroad labor is organized by crafts and each brotherhood has its
own trade agreement with the carrier, occupational departmentalization in
the railroad industry for the most part follows craft lines. In some cases,
however, the seniority group is either larger or smaller than the organized
craft unit. Thus firemen are combined for seniority purposes with engi-
neers, 6 trainmen with conductors,87 telegraphers with train dispatchers8 s
83. See Jeffery-DeWitt Insulator Co. and Local No. 455, United Brick and Clay
Workers of America, 1 N L RB 618, 623 (1936).
84. Under the General Laws of the International Typographical Union the recog-
nition of departments in printing shops is optional with the local unions; but in no
case may a foreman transfer a person to a department he is not familiar with and
then declare him incompetent. For a construction of the rule see Robinson v. Dahm,
94 Misc. 729, 159 N. Y. Supp. 1053 (Sup. Ct. 1916) ; for its origin see BA-LrT, op. cit.
supra note 1, at 234. Cf. United Textile Workers and Hannah Picket Nfills (1934),
cited in Crew, The Textile Labor Relations Board (1935) 41 AV. V. L. Q. 189, 190.
85. Roum'Ran, op. cit. supra note 1, at 223 et seq.
86. Firemen are thus in line for promotion to engineers; and the engineers may,
when work is slack, displace the members of the lower ranking craft. The latter must
bear, therefore, the main burden of unbmployment. The relations between the Brother-
hood of Locomotive Engineers and the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Engine-
men are governed by the "Chicago Joint Agreement" of 1913, which has been repeatedly
amended. See REPORT OF Tim EIGHT-HoUR ComsuissioN, op. cit. snpra note 1, at 309.
See also, SELEKM A, op. cit. supra note 43 at 30. Cf. Mosshamer v. Wabash Ry., 227
Mich. 407, 412, 413, 191 N. V. 210, 211 (1922).
87. For a more detailed description, see Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v. Nat.
Mediation Board, 88 F. (2d) 757 (App. D. C. 1936); Rouzrrnz, op. cit. supra note 1
at 29, 130.
88. See R. R. Labor Board III No. 1034 (1922); Nat. R. RL Adj. Board, Third
Div. II No. 117 (1935).
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Mechanical workers, on the other hand, are subdivided under one agreement
into as many as twenty-four classes.8 9 Sometimes other bases of classification
are superimposed on the craft division. One criterion frequently utilized is
type of service. Thus employees engaged in freight service are often separated
from their fellows in the passenger department;9° yardmen and roadmen are
likewise generally differentiated.Y1 Occasionally the lines of organized
unions cut a craft into separate seniority groups. Welders, for instance, are
subdivided according to whether they are machinists or boilermakers. 2 De-
partmentalization of this sort often causes inconvenience to the carrier since
it operates to place men qualified to do the same work in different seniority
groups, between which no interchange of employees is allowed.
93
Along geographical lines divisions are frequently, but not always, made
co-extensive with the operating departments. These divisions, however,
may vary considerably in scope. Thus while telegraphers on the New York,
New Haven & Hartford R. R. acquire seniority in the various Superin-
tendents' Divisions,94 clerks have seniority only at their particular station
or job.9 5 The size of the division may even differ for the same type of
employee. The seniority of maintenance of way employees, for instance,
may be confined to the subdepartment and the point at which they are
employed,90 or extended over the jurisdiction of one division engineer, or
of one track supervisor, or over districts specifically defined in the agree-
89. Agreement between -the N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. and System Federation
No. 17, Railway Employees Department, Mechanical Section thereof (April 9, 1937),
Rule 28.
90. Cf. Nat. R. R. Adj. Board, First Div. III No. 430 (1935).
91. Cf. Nat. R. R. Adj. Board, First Div. VIII No. 1495, 1497, 1508-1510 (citing
earlier cases) 1527; Garrison, supra note 16, at 590. For a controversy between yard
and road employees, see Hunt v. Dunlap, 248 S. W. 760 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923). The
difference between the rules governing and the experiences obtained in yard and road
service accounts for the separation of the two classes.
92. RouNmhEE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 222.
93. See statement of J. Kruttschmitt, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the
Southern Pacific Co.: "Under the present classification rules of the Shop Crafts, in
order to change a nozzle tip in the front end of a locomotive, it is necessary to call
a boilermaker and his helper to open the door, because that is boilermakers' work;
to call a pipeman and his helper to remove the blower pipe, because that is pipemen's
work; and to call a machinist and his helper to remove the tip, because that is machin-
ists' work; also for the same force to be employed for putting in the new tip." The
Railroad Inquiry, issued by authority of the Association of Railway Executives, 1921,
Bull. No. 6.
94. Telegraphers' Agreement (March 25, 1927) art. 11-C, 12-D. For a description
of "office seniority," see McIsAAc, op. cit. supra note 1, at 258.
95. Agreement (July 1, 1921), Art. II, Rule 6.
96. Agreement between the N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. and the Brotherhood of
Maintenance of Way Employees representing Shop and Roundhouse Laborers (Septem-
ber 1, 1936), Rule 1(c).
[Vol. 47 - 73
1937] SENIORITY RIGHTS IN LABOR RELATIONS 87
ment, or over the entire system of the carrier. 7 The Big Four Brother-
hoods, on the other hand, have ordinarily secured a seniority departmental-.
ization independent of the operating set-up of the carrier, by defining in the
trade agreements the geographical limits of their seniority districts.
Departmentalization operates to limit the rights of both employer and em-
ployee. If a carrier, by mistake or in an emergency, assigns work of one
department to members of another, it must not only compensate the men
who were entitled to do the work, but it may also be forced to pay additional
sums to the employees who were compelled to step outside of their class. 5
An employee, of course, can exercise his seniority rights only within his
division. But employees in a division where work is slack may under some
agreements demand to be transferred to another district where all are em-
ployed. Generally the transferee must start at the bottom of the list in
the new division, 9 but the agreements exhibit a marked diversity. He may
under some provisions, for example, be allowed to retain half or even all
his seniority.100 Transfers may usually be made against the will of the
employee only if seniority is left intact.' 0 ' But the effect of this provision
depends largely on fortuitous circumstances, for a seniority date which places
its holder at the top of the list in his old district may leave him at the
bottom of the roster in the new department. A voluntary transfer 1 2 gener-
ally operates to extinguish the seniority rights of the transferee in his old
department. 03 Although he is occasionally allowed to retain his rights, he
cannot accumulate seniority while absent.10
97. Agreement between the N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. and Brotherhood of Main-
tenance of Way Employees (November 6, 1936), Rule 2. For a peculiar lind of
regulation, see Donovan v. Travers, 285 Mass. 167, 188 N. E. 705 (1934).
98. Nat. R. R. Adj. Board, First Div., cases cited supra note 91; Garrison, supra
note 16, at 589, 590.
99. Cf. Unkovitch v. New York Cent. R. Co., 117 N. J. Eq. 20, 174 Ati. 876
(1934).
100. For more details, see McIsaAc, op. cit. supra note 1, at 259.
101. Cf. Engineers' agreement with the N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. (June 1, 1928),
art. 26(A); Firemen's Agreement with the N. Y., N. H. & H1 R. R. (July 1, 1931)
art. 40(A).
102. There may be doubts as to what amounts to a "transfer"; see c.g., Griffin v.
Chicago Union Station, 13 F. Supp. 722 (N. D. IlL 1936).
103. Cf. Florestano v. Northern Pac. Ry., 198 Mim. 203, 269 N. WN. 407 (1936);
McClure v. Louisville & N. R. R., 16 Tenn. App. 369, 64 S. IV. (2d) 538 (1933);
Panhandle & S. F. Ry. v. Wilson, 55 S. NV. (2d) 216 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) ; McGregor
v. Louisville & N. R. R., 244 Ky. 696, 51 S. IV. (2d) 953 (1932); West v. Baltimore
& 0. R. R., 103 V. Va. 417, 137 S. F. 654 (1927); Aulich v. Craigmyle, 248 Ky.
676, 59 S. W. (2d) 560 (1933). The agreement between a railroad and its employee
to disregard the rule in a particular case has been held to violate the trade agreement
and hence to be beyond the power of the corporation. Chicago, R. L & P. Ry. v.
-Sawyer, 176 Okla. 446, 56 P. (2d) 418 (1936).
104. Cf. Boucher v. Godfrey, 119 Conn. 622, 178 At. 655 (1935). A peculiar arrange-
ment obtains in the oil industry where employees carry double or even multiple seniority.
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Since the value of a seniority right depends in large part on the number
of jobs to which it is referable, the allocation of jobs between districts be-
comes a matter of paramount importance. The problem may arise both in
the initial allotment and in redistributions necessitated by operating changes.
The former is a relatively simple task, since the initial apportionment is
almost always automatic. Allocation has been necessary only in the case
of those train runs which pass through more than one seniority district.
Various rules have been developed to handle this situation. The runs may
be awarded to the district in which the greatest mileage is made, or alter-
nated between districts, or divided between districts, either equally or on
the basis of another percentage which is usually fixed according to the
mileage in each district. In the absence of pertinent provisions in the trade
agreement it is competent for the union to allocate the proper share to
each division ;1o5 on the other hand, a one-sided distribution by the carrier
does not bind the employees. 10 6
Once a job has become identified with a particular division, it is generally
retained within that division, even in the face of operating modifications.
When a carrier moves a position from one seniority district to another,
the incumbent may retain the position, and it is continued under the juris-
diction of the first seniority district, until some new arrangement is made
between employer and union. Accounting work that had been transferred
to a central office from the offices of local freight agents was, for
example, held to be pre-empted by the local clerks who had performed the
work.10 7 A similar rule applies when a carrier introduces mechanical im-
provements. Thus when a carrier installed an electrically driven belt con-
veyor for purposes of mail transportation, the employees who had formerly
handled the mail were held to be entitled to the positions at the conveyor.103
Nor is the employer permitted to effect economies by assigning the work of
one group of employees to another. Even though the amount of daily
telegraphy work at a particular position, for example, may dwindle to a
A worker may start as an unskilled laborer, thereby acquiring plant seniority, and then
advance through the various departments, accumulating special seniority rights in each
of them, while retaining the privilege of returning to the labor force and displacing
any man who is his junior in plant seniority. (1937) 44 MONTHLY LAD. REV. 420.
105. In the absence of fraud, arbitrariness or grave procedural defects the determina-
tion by the union concludes the rights of the employees. McMurray v. Brotherhood,
50 F. (2d) 968 (W. D. Penna. 1931), aff'd, 54 F. (2d) 923 (C.C.A. 3d, 1931);
Harris v. Missouri Pac. R. R., 1 F. Supp. 946 (E. D. Ill. 1931) ; Louisville & N. R. R.
v. Bryant, 263 Ky. 578, 92 S. W. (2d) 749 (1936); Ryan v. New York Cent. R. R.,
267 Mich. 202, 255 N. W. 365 (1934); Crisler v. Crum, 115 Neb. 375, 213 N. W. 366
(1927); Burger v. McCarthy, 84 W. Va. 697, 100 S. E. 492 (1919).
106. Gordon v. Hawkins, 66 S. W. (2d) 432 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
107. Nat. R. R. Adj. Board, Third Div. II No. 198, 199 (1936). See also, R. R.
Lab. Board IV No. 1742 (1923); V No. 2236 (1924).
108. Nat R. R. Adj. Board, Third Div., I No. 5 (1935).
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minimum, the carrier must maintain the telegrapher's position rather than
assign whatever work is left to the train crews.109 The complete abolition
of useless positions is, of course, permitted; but the test of what amounts
to abolition is usually strict and the carrier may not continue part of the
functions of the allegedly discontinued position in disguised form.110 The
prohibition against assigning work of one department to another applies
equally to the assignment of a department's work to an outside group. This
rule outlaws the former practice of hiring independent contractors for work
that could be performed by employees of the carrier.'
A more difficult problem is presented when a change affects the whole
structure of the seniority districts. Various reasons may lead to such modi-
fications. The carrier may readjust his operating departments; he then
will seek to obtain a corresponding rearrangement of the seniority districts
because of the convenience of having seniority districts coextensive with
operating departments."- On the other hand the union may also feel
prompted to demand the change or consolidation of seniority districts, par-
ticularly when old employees are laid off in one district in which work is
slack, while younger men are fully employed in another division.'13 The
most frequent cause of this situation is the consolidation of railroads or of
road facilities, such as yards or tracks.1 4 When work in one road or yard
is abandoned entirely and is concentrated in another, the employees of the
abandoned district can escape complete unemployment only if their seniori-
ties are merged with those of the subsisting district. But the employees
of the subsisting district will vigorously oppose such a move, and the em-
ployer may join them in order to avoid the costs incident to a seniority
109. Nat. R. R. Adj. Board, Third Div. II No. 244-246 (1936); see 11 R. Lab.
Board VI No. 3418 (1925); Garrison, mtpra note 16, at 589.
110. Nat. R. R. Adj. Board, Third Div. I No. 18, 94 (1935), II No. 139, 233,
234, 236 (1936).
111. R. R. Lab. Board III No. 982, 1077, 1262 (1922); V No. 20SO (1924);
Nat. R R. Adj. Board, First Div. II No. 351 (1935); Third Div. II No. 180 (1936).
112. See Long v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 155 hid. 265, 271, 141 At. 504, 505 (1928)
where the court describes the inconveniences arising from the incongruity of operating
and seniority departments: " . . . it was necessary for the engineers worling in
this yard, and repeatedly passing from one end of the yard to the other, . . . to
have their engineers and crews change every time an engine crossed the intangible
boundary line between the two brotherhood divisions . . . Such an impossible situation
cried out for a solution . . . ." Other technical difficulties are described in Burton
v. Oregon-Washington L P_ & N. C., 148 Ore. 648, 38 P. (2d) 72 (1934). But see
Nat R. K. Adj. Board, Third Div. I No. 99 (1935).
113. See, e.g., Board of Street Ry. Commissioners of Detroit, The Motor Coach
Operators' Ass'n, and Amalg. Ass'n of Street & Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach EmpL of
Am, Local 26, 1(old) N. L. R. B. 123 (1934). A similar situation was presented in
Malone v. Gardner, 62 F. (2d) 15 (C. C. A. 4th, 1932).
114. See REPORT OF THE FEDmRa. Co-OnRNAToR OF TRMsponTATion, ,. pra note 44,
at 139, et seq.
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merger. The attitude of the union will in such a case frequently be dictated
by the group of members that commands a majority.
Since there is often no essential clash between the employer and the
union, an agreement for merger of the seniority districts may be made.
But no matter how willing employer and union may be to arrive at an
equitable solution, there must always be some employees whose seniority
standing is adversely affected by a consolidation of the rosters. In an effort
to set aside arrangements entered into between employer and union, em-
ployees so injured have frequently claimed that seniority is an inviolable
property right.1 1 5 While an analysis of whether seniority may be thus
termed is not particularly productive, it would seem that seniority, rising
as it does from a collective trade agreement, is subject to modification by
common action of employer and union. Whatever theory of trade agreement
is adopted,'1 6 the rights accruing to the single worker under the agreement
must be taken to be subject to the condition of the continuing existence of
the trade agreement. Hence it has been repeatedly held that changes in
the seniority structure properly agreed upon between the employer and the
labor organization are binding upon the single worker." 7 Courts insist,
however, that the union, in modifying the existing seniority arrangements
must observe the procedure prescribed in its constitution and by-laws,i 18
and must act in good faith for the purpose of reaching a genuine collective
agreement." 9
Minorities of union members, feeling aggrieved by the seniority policy
of their organization, have attempted to defend or to improve their standing
by seceding from the old union, forming a new one and seeking independent
trade agreements with the employers. If such an attempt is successful, it
115. See, e.g., Grand-Int. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Mills, 43 Ariz.
379, 31 P. (2d) 971 (1934).
116. For the various theories regarding the legal effects of collective trade agree-
ments, see, e.g., Anderson, Collective Bargaining Agreements (1936) 15 Oa. L. Rzv.
229; Christenson, Legally Enforceable Interests in American Labor Union .Working
Agreements (1933) 9 In. L. J. 69; Fuchs, Collective Labor Agreements in American
Law (1925) 10 ST. Louis L. Rav. 1; Johnson, An Analysis of the Present Legal Status
of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (1935) 10 NorRE DAME LAWy. 413; Rice,
Collective Labor Agreements in American Law (1931) 44 HARv. L. Ray. 572; Comments
(1932) 41 YALE L. J. 1221; (1924) 24 COL. L. REV. 409; (1931) 31 CoL. L. Rv. 1156;
(1932) 10 N. C. L. Rzv. 394.
117. Aden v. Louisville & N. R. R., 276 S. W. 511 (Ky. 1921); Long v. Baltimore
& 0. R. R., 155 Md. 265, 141 Atl. 504 (1928) ; Henry v. Twichell, 286 Mass. 106, 189
N.E. 593 (1934); G. T. Ross Lodge No. 831 v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 191
Minn. 373, 254 N. W. 590 (1934); Yazoo & M. V. R. R. v. Mitchell, 173 Miss. 594,
161 So. 860 (1935); Franklin v. Pennsylvania-Reading Seashore Lines, 193 Atl. 712
(N. J. Ch. 1937); Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Price, 108 S.W. (2d) 239
(Tex. Civ. App. 1937). But see Grand Int. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v.
Mills, 43 Ariz. 379, 31 P. (2d) 971 (1934).
118. Gleason v. Thomas, 186 S. E. 304 (W. Va. 1936).
119. Piercy v. Louisville & N. Ry., 198 Ky. 477, 248 S.W. 1042 (1923).
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may result in the establishment of a new and separate seniority group, the
top places of which are occupied by men who were in the lower seniority
ranks of their former organization. While grave abuses or oppressive prac-
tices in the old union may justify such a course,20 it is socially undesirable
under normal conditions. The splitting up of a labor organization weakens
the workers' bargaining power; the existing seniority system is under-
mined, and valuable rights acquired by long years of patient waiting are
threatened with destruction. In one case that came before the National
Labor Relations Board' 21 an agreement entered into behveen employer and
union for the consolidation of two seniority divisions (trolley car and bus
conductors) would have resulted in the discharge of more than 150 bus
operators. The bus men thereupon seceded and attempted to enter into
a separate trade agreement with the employer. Tl~e National Labor Rela-
tions Board held that the bus operators did not constitute an appropriate
bargaining unit, but that the proper unit was the trolley car and the bus
conductors combined. This ruling operated to defeat the secessionists, since
the trolley car men by their command of a majority could select the union
representatives.
If the union and employer are unable to reach an agreement, either of
these parties may attempt to force a seniority consolidation by resorting to
the provisions of the trade agreement. Some of the agreements contain
express stipulations against the merger of seniority districts by the em-
ployer.'m A detailed enumeration of the seniority divisions in the agree-
ment would likewise seem to bind the carrier,0 and probably the union.'"
Other trade agreements, by providing only for the consequences resulting
from changes and mergers of seniority districts, seem to assume that the
carrier is entitled to effect such changes.125 'Where the seniority districts
120. Seniority regulations have been declared unreasonable and arbitrary and there-
fore null and void in Cameron v. International Alliance, 118 N. J. Eq. 11, 176 AtL.
692 (1935), 119 N. 3. Eq. 577, 183 At. 157 (1936); Collins v. International Alliance,
119 N. J. Eq. 230, 182 At. 37 (1935); (1935) 44 Ym.n L J. 1446; (1936) 45 YA=-
L. 3. 1494; (1935) 19 MWxN. L REv. 818; cf. Walsche v. Sherlock, 110 N. J. Eq. 223,
159 At. 661 (1932). Seniority in these cases, however, was not based on length of
service, but on length of union membership.
121. Board of Street Ry. Comm'rs of Detroit, The Motor Coach Operators' Ass'n
and .the Amalg. Ass'n of Street and Elec. Ry. and Motor Coach EmpL of Am., Local
26, 1(old) N. L. R. B. 123 (1934).
122. See, e.g., Agreement between a Midwest Bus System and a Division of the
Amaig. Ass'n of Street and Elec. Ry. and Motor Coach Empl of Am., §XI part 7:
"During the continuance of this Agreement there shall be no combination of the...
seniority lists into one seniority list . . . MoroR TxsPor Rmo:rr, op. cit. jupra
note 6, at 187.
123. R. R. iab. Board, III No. 1039 (1922).
124. Cf. Nat. R. R. Ad!. Board, Third Div. I No. 99 (1935).
125. See, e.g., the agreement between the N. Y., N. I-L & H. R. R. and the Brother-
hood of Ry. and Steamship Clerks (July 1, 1921), Rule 26.
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are in terms identified with the operating departments, 12 the change or con-
solidation of the latter automatically affects the former; both employer
and union can therefore insist, under such a provision, that the department-
alization of seniority rights must be assimilated to any alterations in the
operating set-up.
127
Even in the absence of appropriate provisions in the trade agreement or
of a subsequent agreement between the parties,128 the employees of a district
abandoned because of a railroad merger may seek to protect their seniority
rights by invoking the aid of the Interstate Commerce Commission. The
Commission is empowered to authorize mergers of railroad systems subject
to such conditions as it shall find just and reasonable.120 And in one case1 80
the Commission, in granting the application for a merger, imposed the
condition that the applicant railroad should hire the employees of the merged
corporation, should maintain a separate seniority register for them and
should otherwise see to it that they would not suffer in their tenure by the
consolidation. But in cases of consolidations of station or yard facilities,
and of road abandonment, the Commission did not deem itself authorized
to protect the interest of the employees.' 3' In these situations the Act
permits the imposition only of such conditions as the public convenience
and necessity may require ;132 and the Commission thought that the preserva-
tion of employment was a private rather than a public benefit.
126. See notes 94-97, supra.
127. R. R. Lab. Board IV No. 1676 (1923); Nat. R. R. Adj. Board, Third Div.
II No. 183 (1936). If two districts are combined under the jurisdiction of one super-
intendent, the seniorities are merged, even though the two districts may still be owned
by two legally separate corporate entities. Ibid.
128. In the absence of union assent the merger by two carriers of their seniority
lists has been held to be ineffective and violative of the agreement in force. McCoy
v. St. Joseph B. Ry., 229 Mo. App. 506, 77 S. W. (2d) 175 (1934) ; McGee v. St. Joseph
B. Ry., 93 S. W. (2d) 1111 (Mo. App. 1936) (assent to merger was given by un-
authorized union officer.) And cf. Grand Int. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers
v. Mills, 43 Ariz. 379, 31 P. (2d) 971 (1934); Aden v. Louisville & N. R. Co.,
276 S. W. 511 (Ky., 1921); Long v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 155 Md. 265, 141 At.
504 (1928); Henry v. Twichell, 286 Mass. 106, 189 N. E. 593 (1934); G. T. Ross
Lodge No. 831 v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 191 Minn. 373, 254 N. W. 590
(1934); Graham v. Grand Div. Order of R. R. Coriductors, 107 S. W. (2d) 121
(Mo. App. 1937); Franklin v. Pennsylvania-Reading Seashore Line, 193 Atl. 712
(N. ., Ch. 1937); Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Price, 108 S. W. (2d) 239
(Tex. Civ. App. 1937); Gleason v. Thomas, 186 S. E. 304 (W. Va. 1936).
129. Interstate Commerce Act, § 5(4) (b), 48 STAT. 217 (1933), 49 U. S. C. § 5(4) (b)
(1934).
130. St. Paul Bridge &I Terminal Ry. Control, 199 I. C. C. 588 (1934).
131. Chicago Gt. W. R. R. Trackage, 207 I. C. C. 315 (1935); Atchison, T. &
S. F. Ry. Abandonment, 212 I. C. C. 423 (1936).
132. Interstate Commerce Act § 1(18), (20), 41 STAT. 477, 478 (1920), 49 U.S.C.
§1(18), (20) (1934).
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The precise manner in which the consolidation of the districts is to be
effected is sometimes spelled out in the trade agreement, and is normally
indicated in agreements entered into between the employer and the union
for the specific purpose of executing the merger. Thus trade agreements
have provided that positions corresponding to those existing before the
merger shall be retained by the employees occupying them formerly.las But
when the Railroad Adjustment Board elicits from the terms of a trade
agreement the implication that a merger is required, there is normally no
provision for the technical execution of the merger. The Board then requires
employer and union to negotiate in common conference an agreement upon
a consolidated roster. 34 If no agreement can be reached, the Board orders
that the seniorities be "dovetailed". 135 The employees, under this system,
simply retain their old seniority dates and are assigned to their places on
the consolidated roster accordingly. While this method is recommended by
the Federal Coordinator of Transportation, 30 it is doubtful whether it is
the most equitable. If one of the two enterprises that are merged is of a
comparatively recent origin, its employees stand no chance of obtaining a
fair share of the consolidated work, even though the business of their former
employer may have been the better one and may have contributed a large
number of the jobs available in the consolidated enterprise. In one case"T
a local union applied the "dovetailing" rule to the merger of two printing
shops; as a result many employees of one shop, although occupying advanced
positions on their roster, had 'to be dismissed, while employees of the other
shop, who had been out of work a long time, were called back. The result
was so unsatisfactory that the court upset the ruling of the union and
reinstated the displaced employees to their former positions. It would seem
a better method to compare the amount of work contributed by the two
combining enterprises and to allocate proportionate fractions of the work
still available to each of the two competing groups of employees. This solu-
tion has been widely adopted.' 38
133. See Cannon v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 262 Ky. 113, 89 S. NV. (2d)
620 (1935); Nat. R. R. Adj. Board, Third Div. II No. 102 (1935).
134. See, e.g., Nat. R. R. Adj. Board, Third Div. I No. 85 (1935); First Div. VIII
No. 1561 (1936).
135. See, e.g., Nat. R. R. Adj. Board, Third Div. II No. 183, 190 (1936). A similar
system of merging seniorities is reported in Long v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 155 Md.
265, 141 Ati. 504 (1928). Cf. Henry v. Twichell, 286 Mass. 106, 189 N. E. 593 (1934).
136. Raponr, .stpra note 44, at 141.
137. Hamilton v. Rouse, 178 App. Div. 81, 165 N. Y. Supp. 173 (1st Dep't 1917).
See also R. R. Labor Board, IV No. 1676 (1923).
138. See the constitution of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen,
art. 13, § 16(a). The laws of the Order of Railhway Conductors, § 62, make the mileage
ran on the territory of each district the standard of allocation. See Graham v. Grand
Division, 107 S. W. (2d) 121 (Mo. App. 1937). Other standards that have been ap-
plied are, e.g., the relative engine hours of two yards merged [Nat. R. R. Adj. Board,
First Div. VIII No. 1561 (1936); Yazoo & M. V. R. R. v. Mitchell, 173 Miss. 594,
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FORMAL RULES
Seniority rights may be affected, finally, by the formal rules governing
the administration of seniority lists. Seniority rosters listing the employees
in the order of their service age are maintained ordinarily by the employer,
occasionally by the union. Even where the employer keeps the list, the word
of the union representative regarding a man's seniority date carries great
authority. It ordinarily binds the employee affected,18 9 provided he is given
a fair hearing 140 and the determination is not arbitrary or unfair.
141
The seniority roster is ordinarily readjusted once or hvice a year. It is
posted on the bulletin board for the information of all the employees and
copies are furnished to the officers of the union or brotherhood. Mistakes
and errors in the list must be protested within a specified time, usually thirty
days. The trade agreements generally provide that the roster will be taken
as correct if no protest is lodged. Courts are inclined to enforce this pro-
vision and to hold the dilatory employee estopped from claiming a mistake
in the seniority list.142 But the Railroad Boards have often mitigated the
severity of the rule by allowing the rectification of a wrong seniority date
at the next roster revision.143 No prediction can be made as to when the
board will permit such corrections, for although a distinction has been made
between names entirely omitted and names erroneously listed, it has not
been maintained consistently. 44
161 So. 860 (1935)], or the'relative earnings of the two districts consolidated [Franklin
v. Pennsylvania-Reading Seashore Lines, 193 Atl. 712 (N. 3. Ch. 1937)], or a plain
fifty-fifty rule [Eastern Air Transport, Inc., and Air Line Pilots' Ass'n, 1 N. L. B.
28 (1933); G. T. Ross Lodge No. 831 v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 191
Minn. 373, 254 N. W. 590 (1934)].
139. Aulich v. Craigmyle, 248 Ky. 676, 59 S. W. (2d) 560 (1933); Norfolk &
W. Ry. v. Harris, 260 Ky. 132, 84 S. W. (2d) 69 (1935); Cannon v. Brotherhood
of Railroad Trainmen, 262 Ky. 113, 89 S. W. (2d) 620 (1935) ; Donovan v. Travers,
285 Mass. 167, 188 N. E. 705 (1934); Mosshamer v. Wabash Ry., 221 Mich. 407,
191 N. W. 210 (1922); Ryan v. New York Central Ry., 267 Mich. 202, 255 N. W.
365 (1934); Casey v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 197 Minn.
189, 266 N. W. 737 (1936) ; Hunt v. Dunlap, 248 S. W. 760 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923) ;
West v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 103 W. Va. 417, 137 S. E. 654 (1927). See also cases
cited, notes 105, 117-119, mipra.
140. Nat. R. R. Adj. Board, Third Div. II No. 257 (1936).
141. See Piercy v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 198 Ky. 477, 248 S. W. 1042 (1923);
cases cited note 139, .rpra.
142. Moore v. Yazoo & M. V. R. R., 176 Miss. 65, 166 So. 395 (1936).
143. Nat. R. R. Adj. Board, Third Div. II No. 201, 250 (1936). The carrier, too,
is not precluded, by the erroneous omission of a name from the seniority list, from
assigning the proper seniority date to an employee. R. R. Lab. Board VI No. 3797
(1925).
144. Cf. Nat R. R. Adj. Board, Third Div. I No. 77 (1935) and R. R. Lab.
Board VI No. 3427 (1925) with the case cited note 143, supra. Occasionally there
is a tendency to pass tacitly over alleged laches where justice appears to require it.
See Nat R. R. Adj. Board, Third Div. I No. 61 (1935), II No. 257 (1936).
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Vacancies occurring in the service must ordinarily be bulletined within
ten days.145 The rate of pay and conditions of the vacant job must be dearly
indicated; if the notice is defective, the job, even though already filled, must
be bulletined again.146 The carrier is responsible for the correctness of the
statements in the bulletin, and an employee deterred from bidding in a
job because of errors may demand full compensation.147 An employee wish-
ing to assert his right to a vacancy must do so within a short specified period.
CONCLUSION
The experience of the railroad and printing industries demonstrates rather
dearly the feasibility of the seniority system; but before judgment can be
passed on its desirability, a more detailed analysis must be made of the
effect of the system on the individual worker, the union and the employer.
Seniority of course provides a greater measure of security to the individual
worker. He will not be automatically weeded out from the production
process when he becomes older and less able to adapt himself to a loss of
his job, for it takes a shortcoming on the part of the employee more serious
than a mere suspicion of slackening speed to justify a discharge in departure
from the seniority order.148 At the same time, however, seniority is a barrier
against rapid and extraordinary advances'4 9 since the power of the man-
agement to grant exceptional promotions for exceptional ability is narrowly
restricted and is indeed viewed with extreme jealousy by labor itself.=co But
the seniority rule is attractive to the individual worker in other respects.
The use of the "speed-up" may be partially checked by the elimination of
arbitrariness in discharging and rehiring, since the success of the "speed-up"
depends largely on the worker's constant fear of losing his job at the slightest
sign of a slackened pace.' 51 The practice of refusing to let an employee
know whether he is definitely discharged after a seasonal lay-off, and thereby
145. The employer's duty to bulletin a vacant job is not relieved if a survey
of the working force yields no suitable employee. . R. Lab. Board V No. 2484
(1924).
146. Nat. R. R. Adj. Board, Third Div. I No. 81 (1935).
147. Nat R. R. Adj. Board, Third Div. II No. 254 (1936).
148. FERAL CO-ORDINATOR OF TRANSPORTATION, ComPARATivn LA-OR ST&i-DAwns
in TRANSPORTATION (1937, mimeogr.) 123; E. C. BvowN, op. cit. upra note 1, at
102, 111; notes 64, et seq., supra. As a result of seniority, railroad conductors in em-
ployment are today at least fifty years of age and have twenty-five years of railvay
service; see J. D. BROWN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 106; (1932) 93 RAmWAY AGE 779.
149. The attitude of labor towards seniority is necessarily influenced by the char-
acteristics of the various crafts. See E. C. Brown's intelligent discussion of this
question in reference to seniority in the printing trades, op. cit. mspra note 1, at 103.
And see the objections against the priority rule voiced by President Lynch of Typo-
graphical Union 6. BAxmrr, op. cit. supra note 1, at 241.
150. FAGAN, LABOR AND T E RAILoAVs (1909) 39.
151. AuTomoBH.E REPoar, op. cit. supra note 56, "Conditions of the Industry" 46, 51.
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causing him to refrain from seeking other employment, will likewise be
curbed by an established order of reinstatements.
1 2
The position of organized unions is also considerably strengthened by
seniority. The rule is a valuable expedient for preventing anti-union dis-
crimination' 5" since it forces the employer to show good cause for any
departure from the established order.'" The mere prohibition of discrim-
ination against union members and union activities'" is doomed to failure
unless the employer is called upon to give reasons for laying off a union
member rather than a non-member.158 This fact has been recognized by
the National Labor Relations Board which has held that disregard of sen-
iority, if coupled with other circumstances, 157 was indicative of discriminatory
intention, 58 even where the employer had made no seniority agreement.1 60
The Board has gone still further. When an employer refused to reinstate
former strikers after the termination of a strike caused or prolonged'60 by
152. Id. at 50.
153. Seniority may operate also to curb discrimination against non-members of the
union. R. R. Lab. Board IV No. 1975 (1923).
154. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. and Boot and Shoe Workers' Union, 1 N L R B
803, 821-822, 829 (1936). But the power of the employer to recognize differences in
ability reduces the effectiveness of seniority as a preventive of discrimination. See p.
82, supra.
155. Such prohibitions are frequently found in tr'ade agreements. See, e.g., the
Sinclair Agreement, note 73, supra, § 23.
156. Regarding the burden of proof in discrimination cases, see Comment (1935)
48 HAiv. L. REv. 630, 650.
157. In the absence of a trade agreement the employer is under no duty to apply
the seniority rule. See, e.g., Boucher v. Godfrey, 119 Conn. 622, 178 Atl. 655 (1935);
Battle v. Atlantic Coast Line, 132 Ga. 376, 64 S. E. 463 (1909); Norfolk & W. Ry.
Co. v. Harris, 260 Ky. 132, 84 S. W. (2d) 69 (1935); Casey v. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 197 Minn. 189, 266 N. W. 737 (1936).
158. The departure from seniority does not of itself constitute a discriminatory
action prohibited by the practice of the Labor Boards. Johnson Bronze Co. and Inter-
national Brotherhood of Foundry Employees, 2(old) N L RB 161 (1935); .Vincennes
Packing Co. and Federal Labor Union 19511, 2(old) N L R B 433 (1935).
159. Eastern Air Transport, Inc., and Air Line Pilots' Ass'n, 1 N L B 28 (1933);
F. & N. Lawn Mower Co. and International Ass'n of Machinists, etc., 2 (old)
N L R B 245 (1935); Brown Shoe Co. and Boot and Shoe Workers' Union, Local
No. 655, 1 N L R B 803 (1936) ; Segall-Maigen, Inc., and International Ladies' Garment
Workers Union, Local No. 50, 1 N L RB 749 (1936); Appalachian Electric Power
Co. and International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 906,
3 NLRB No. 21 (1937).
160. When a strike, unjustified at its inception, has become justified by the em-
ployer's subsequent refusal to bargain collectively with the strikers, the latter, upon
termination of the strike, can displace only such strike breakers as have been hired
after the employer's refusal of collective bargaining. Columbian Enameling & Stamping
Co. and Enameling and Stamping Mill Employees Union, No. 19694, 1 N L RB 181
(1936); Jeffery-DeWitt Insulator Co. and Local No. 455, United Brick and Clay
Workers of America, 1 N L R B 618 (1936); Pioneer Pearl Button Co. and Button
Workers Union, Fed. Local 20026, 1 NLRB 837 (1936).
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unfair labor practices of the employer, the refusal to rehire has been treated
as an unfair labor practice.106 These rulings encourage a more aggressive
unionism, for the disposition of workers to strike should be increased if
the risk of ultimately losing their jobs is lessened. And employers who
cannot promise permanent employment to prospective strikebreakers may
be somewhat handicapped in fighting strikes.
Seniority not only provides the unions with a valuable anti-discriminatory
device, but also furnishes a strong impetus to union membership. Today one
of the chief talking points of many organizing campaigns is that a strong
union can induce an employer to establish a seniority system. Where sen-
iority has already been attained, it still provides an incentive for workers
to become or to remain union members. Many agreements restrict seniority
rights to union members;162 even where seniority extends to non-mem-
bers,163 the trade agreements generally vest the union with large powers
over the administration of seniority,164 and the worker may feel safer if he
is not in the position of a non-member contesting the right of a member.
Seniority has encountered considerable emotional opposition from em-
ployers. The right to hire and fire is said to be an indispensable element
of being master in one's house.0 5 It has also been argued that if employees
feel too well assured of their jobs their efficiency is lowered;'C" that the
pressure to retain older employees in the service lowers the morale of the
161. See, e.g., National Lock Co. and Federal Labor Union, No. 18830, 1 N L B
15 (1934) ; M. H. Birge & Sons Co. and United Wall Paper Crafts of North America,
1 N LRB 731; Columbia Radiator Co. and International Brotherhood of Foundry
Engineers, Local No. 79, 1 NLRB 847 (1936); Oregon Worsted Co. and United
Textile Workers of America, Local 2435, 3 NLRB, No. 5 (1937). See Bems.nw
Awn VAN DoREN, op. cit. supra note 17, at 253 et scq.
162. E.g., the agreements of the International Ass'n of Oil Field, Gas Well and
Refinery Workers of America; the Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Electric Railway
and Motor Coach Employees, semble.
163. Seniority rights have frequently been held to accrue to non-members of the
union which had concluded the trade agreement; Florestano v. Northern Pac. Ry.,
198 Minn. 203, 269 N. W. 407 (1936); Yazoo & M. V. R. R. v. Sideboard, 161 Miss.
4, 133 So. 669 (1931). Non-members were consequently held bound by the rulings
of the union with respect to seniority to the same extent as union members; Boucher
v. Godfrey, 119 Conn. 622, 178 Atl. 655 (1935) ; G. T. Ross Lodge No. 831 v. Brotherl-
hood of Railroad Trainmen, 191 Minn. 373, 254 N. NV. 590 (1934). Expulsion from
the union was held not to affect the seniority status of the expelled member; George
v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 183 Minn. 610, 235 N. V. 673, 237 N. V. 876 (1931).
Contra: Gary v. Central of Georgia Ry., 44 Ga. App. 120, 160 S. B. 716 (1931).
164. See notes 105, 117-119, 139, supra. A single worker is generally not financially
able to enforce his rights against the employer. See testimony of AV. IV. Atterbury,
Vice-president of the Pennsylvania Railroad, before the U. S. Commission on Industrial
Relations (1916) v. 11, p. 10146.
165. This attitude is reflected by the reluctance of courts to interfere with the
employer's business by enforcing seniority. See note 35, supra.
166. See CATLx, op. cit. supra note 1, at 479, quoting from the N. Y. Evening Post
of September 3, 12, 1913, October 13, 1913.
